

THE NEW YORK PRESS.

EDITORIAL OPINIONS OF THE LEADING JOURNALS UPON CURRENT TOPICS.

COMPILED EVERY DAY FOR EVENING TELEGRAPHS.

The Silence That Condemns.

From the Nation.

Fifteen days have elapsed since Mr. Johnson took the government of Louisiana into his own hands, and allowed it to pass into the charge of a ferocious and bloodthirsty mob. Fifteen days have passed since he learned of the wholesale massacre of unarmed and loyal men, by those to whom he had deputed his authority. When appealed to by pardoned Rebels to suppress a peaceful Convention and to depose the Governor of a State, he lost no time. He could not wait from Saturday to Monday, but hastened upon Sunday to the hands of General Baird, and to direct the forces of the United States to be used in support of the "Thugs" of New Orleans. The Thugs have acted according to their nature. We cannot believe that Mr. Johnson meant that they should enact the scenes of diabolism which they did. We cannot suppose that he intended arrests to be made without the shadow of legal warrant, or the dissemination of disease and unresisting prisoners, the deliberate massacre of unconvicted and unresisting men. But the deed has been done. Even some of his own tools are shocked at their work; why cannot the President speak? He was prompt to telegraph messages against the rebels; he was prompt to publish his telegrams. Has he telegraphed any censure of this bloody work to the Rebels whom he made rulers of Louisiana? If he has, why does he not publish his telegram? What means this silence over measures after such ready speech against "usurpation"?

We trust that all our readers have studied the letter of Mr. E. P. Brooks to the President's organ in this city. Calm and clear in its statements, its impartial record is all the more terrible in its effect upon the mind. It relates how the clergyman who offered prayer at the opening of the Convention came down to surrender himself to the police, with a white handkerchief on the end of his walking stick, and "was met" by a single negro, the policeman, who, with a single word, the policeman, as they called him, with him, emptying their revolvers into his back; how another negro, falling from a policeman's shot while trying to escape, was surrounded by policemen, who fired their pistols into him as he lay on the ground, and how a third raised his arms to implore for mercy, pounded him with their clubs; how a policeman mounted a cart full of dead men, and thrust his revolver between their bodies to kill two men beneath whom he lay; how a fourth, who had been observed, were the acts of the police—the sworn guardians of the public peace into whose hands the city was committed by the express orders of the President. For yet more ghastly scenes among the auditory details, we refer to the same letter, in the New York Times.

These specific details, given voluntarily by an eye-witness, who is a supporter of Mr. Johnson's policy, and who has not withered under the "radicalism" of the North, have been far more than sufficient to show that the word from Mr. Johnson or his organs, the Saratoga Convention has met, and endorsed all the acts of Mr. Johnson. Long speeches were made on the occasion, but we do not notice a single expression of horror over this narrative, which half the members must have read on their way to the place of meeting. They could go out of their way to pledge an affected sympathy for the soldiers of the Union at the North, but could not spare a word for the discharged soldiers who had just been trampled upon, kicked and abused at the South. The President of the Convention declared that he held out his hand to the loyal men of the South, whom he justly called our brothers; but to the blood of these brothers, will before his eyes, but to their cries for help and rescue, he was deaf.

The partisans of the Administration in vain endeavor to evade the responsibility for this appalling crime. But for the President's positive orders, General Baird would have protected the Convention from all violence. It was he, and which General Baird finally took, and which alone stayed the work of death, was contrary to the President's instructions; and it is already announced by one of the President's mouthpieces that the Convention was held in the place. If the whole object, end, and aim of the President's policy is not to turn over the loyal men of the South into the hands of such rulers as Mayor Monroe, and such police as those of New Orleans, who can say that it is not only does he encourage and aid in the rule of such men, but if by accident a man of different mold comes into power, the President either ignores him, as in Tennessee, or threatens him with violent resistance, as in Missouri, or deposes him, as in Louisiana. In short, he maintains such low moral positions, such a loyalty of hatred of treason, of determination that loyal men should rule, is the man under whom to-day past loyalty is made odious, traitors raised to power, and Union men literally crushed under their feet. The President's policy is a political creed which he has not violated, not a promise which he has not broken, scarcely an act of usurpation in his power which he has not committed. But of all his acts none have been so utterly without excuse as this. He has no respect for the Louisiana Convention. His readiness to speak when he had no pretense of right to interfere, and his persistent silence when every instinct of manhood should have drawn him to speak, are his crowning, his damning disgrace.

The War of Races.

From the Tribune.

The Memphis Daily Commercial—a Rebel sheet, of course, none others indulge in such luxuries of war—preaches on this theme a sermon full of loathsome malignity. It is but one of many, we presume; but it is a good specimen of its kind; spicy with newly kindled wrath, and pointed with recent facts of bloody import. The text for the discourse is a passage from Jefferson, written in 1821, when he was seventy-one years of age, and, according to the editorial prophet, in the plenitude of his bright and powerful intellect. The text runs as follows:—"Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people (the negroes) are to be free; nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government. Nature, habit, opinion, have drawn indelible lines of distinction between them."

The points are these:—Jefferson was an anti-slavery man, and would prophesy the most hopeful for the blacks. He was a very able and sagacious man likewise. His first prediction has come true. The second, therefore, will, in all likelihood, come true also. There will be a war of races in the South. But, in a war of races, the black race will not only be victorious, but will be the victor. The third prediction, that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government, is also true. His first prediction destroys itself, and thus pretended philanthropy will prove the destruction of its victims. One or two slips in logic here invite remark; for instance, that the second prediction must be false because the first has been; and that a war of races, the only issue, supposing the second prediction to be justified by experience, in the order of time. We will offer a suggestion or two touching the first dilemma—Jefferson predicted the emancipation of the slaves, by some means, in some probable emergency—exceedingly vague prediction. He also predicted the separation of the races—another prediction even more vague. Events have brought about the formal emancipation of the slaves; but events, therefore, bring about a separation of the races? That depends a little on the

grounds on which the different prophecies were based.

Why did Jefferson predict emancipation? and why did he predict the separation of the races? It is not difficult to answer either question. Jefferson was an abolitionist. He believed that slavery was wrong, and that God was just. He was a statesman, and he saw that the form of government that must in time prevail at the South was opposed to democratic tendencies, and must give way before them. He was a close observer of society, and he could not be blind to the fact that the slave population would eventually be an embarrassing and possibly an unmanageable element in Southern communities. He foresaw the ultimate extinction, therefore, of slavery, as a mistake, a nuisance, a mischief, and a sin. So sure as the Almighty lived, it could not endure; and he trembled for his country while it did. Observation, reflection, conviction, faith, lent their combined vigor to pierce the future when it was no more than a mist. His prediction was not to be baffled; the great conclusion came, though under circumstances which no merely mortal vision could have indicated.

And why did Jefferson, suggesting thus hope for the negro's emancipation, suggest thus dreadfully for his emancipated destiny? Because he was himself a Virginian, with the ideas of a French liberal, but with the habits of a Southern gentleman, used from boyhood to feel about the blacks as the best of Southern gentlemen may feel. His Southern gentility always led him to say that habit and opinion drew an indelible line between the whites and the blacks. When he added "Nature" he meant habit and opinion, which were nature to him, and which he could not see how to get rid of. He was the limits of destiny. God proposed nothing more than he could conceive possible. He could not conceive it possible that whites and blacks could live together in equal freedom under the same government. An immense army of colored men, he thought, would be a disgrace to the Southern States. He could not conceive it possible that whites and blacks could live together in equal freedom under the same government. An immense army of colored men, he thought, would be a disgrace to the Southern States. He could not conceive it possible that whites and blacks could live together in equal freedom under the same government. An immense army of colored men, he thought, would be a disgrace to the Southern States.

But the second has already been justified by the same history that justified the first. Triumphantly exclaims the preacher of Memphis:—"Do you not know what transpired here in Tennessee? Have you not heard of the recent outbreak in New Orleans? Are you blind to the signs of the times in the Carolinas, in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida? Can you not feel the pulse of the chivalry beating with indignation at the disgrace that emancipation would be to the Southern States? Are you blind to the signs of the times in the Carolinas, in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida? Can you not feel the pulse of the chivalry beating with indignation at the disgrace that emancipation would be to the Southern States? Are you blind to the signs of the times in the Carolinas, in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida? Can you not feel the pulse of the chivalry beating with indignation at the disgrace that emancipation would be to the Southern States?"

That strife is impending between the whites and the blacks in the late slave States, we apprehend, very evident. Of that struggle, the blacks may be the occasion, but the whites are the cause. Had emancipation been practically more universal and complete than it is now, the struggle might have been avoided, because then the negroes would have been on a civil and political equality with the former masters, and could have put forth a show of strength that might have held their enemies in check, or even extorted from them concessions of privilege. It is the non-fulfillment to its full extent of Jefferson's first prophecy, which has brought the Convention to its present state. Had freedom been secured and then superseded by the present Napoleon with his coup d'etat and the empire. But why may not the revolutionary contagion spread from Hungary to France, as well as from France to Hungary? When the Emperor's army of 100,000 men, under their hitherto venerated Kaiser with the cry of "Abdicat!" "Abdicat!"—when thousands of brave Hungarians taken as prisoners of war by Prussia, in his service, accept with gratitude the help of Prussia in the undertaking of the independence of Hungary, we may well pause to require—is Austria to go to pieces from this disastrous conflict, or will she still survive, even as a second-rate power. Through the help of Prussia, the independence of Hungary is secured, and the condition of the world will depend as much for its settlement upon the movements of the revolutionary elements upon the continent as upon the managing statesmen of the great powers. We still hold to the belief that the independence of Hungary, in Europe; that war outside of France has become a necessity to Louis Napoleon to avoid an internal revolution, and that while courts and cabinets are discussing the rectification of their boundaries, and the relations of 1848-9, and with the Emperor's army of 100,000 men, under their hitherto venerated Kaiser with the cry of "Abdicat!" "Abdicat!"—when thousands of brave Hungarians taken as prisoners of war by Prussia, in his service, accept with gratitude the help of Prussia in the undertaking of the independence of Hungary, we may well pause to require—is Austria to go to pieces from this disastrous conflict, or will she still survive, even as a second-rate power.

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But, then, if our telegraphic report be strictly correct, he has announced himself as the pliant tool of the public opinion of France. In deference to it only, he now claims to have made demand. In this very declaration, if it be true, lies the "backdoor," which he has always hitherto succeeded in leaving open for any sudden change of position. In deference to that same "public opinion of France" he may believe himself compelled to reinstate upon the demand, to exact a compliance by force. Public opinion, in this sense, is not the blind leading in England, as in France, the Emperor "by the national will" considers himself the master of public opinion, and his referring to it now will put us on our guard, and might prepare us for his leaning upon it again when he proceeds in a different direction. Here and here may be covered up, like the forthcoming chicken in the egg, his future course by the reported caution to Prussia, that she should not extend her power below the river Main. In the latter case, the Emperor's policy, which this caution was expressed, but it contains enough to show that, as in many other occasions, he is just as well now to accept what a German caricaturist once wrote about him, that he likes to be right and squint his eyes left, talks to those in front, while his hands are busily at work behind his back.

The European Question—Napoleon's Difficulty and the Perils of Austria.

From the Herald.

We have a report from Paris of the 15th, by the Atlantic cable, that the French Government had abandoned the idea of extending the frontier of France by the annexation of certain German provinces on the Rhine. Napoleon may have caused certain hints to be thrown out in this direction in order to gain time or to sound the public opinion of France in reference to the "backdoor" suggested. It is not probable that those treaties of 1815 no doubt remains the same as when he made that audacious little speech at Auxerre. He there proclaimed himself the champion of the imperial programme in consequence of his being a Frenchman, and his speech was so understood and accepted by the French people. They have accordingly been expecting great things either from the diplomacy of the Emperor or his splendid army—from a European Congress or campaign on the Rhine.

On the other hand, it may be said, that when Napoleon finds himself in an untenable or dangerous position he does not hesitate to withdraw from it; and his peace with Austria in 1809, his retreat from Moscow, and his flight from Mexico, may be cited as examples of his prevailing prudence under the strongest temptations to rashness. But the abandonment of the idea of the extension of France to the Rhine involves the loss of the prestige of popularity to Napoleon and the empire as to make his surrender quite as dangerous to himself as a declaration of war. It is a question which will probably take as much time for a settlement as the history of the world. We apprehend, indeed, that the sword will at last be required to cut the gordian knot, whatever adjustment may be attempted by diplomacy; for in this matter the question is whether France will maintain her ascendancy on the continent, or quietly consent to be neutralized, overshadowed, and held at bay by the new German Confederation embraced in the new truly powerful kingdom of Prussia.

We can hardly believe, therefore, that the French Emperor will consent to the consideration of the Prussian ultimatum, has abandoned the idea of the Rhine frontier. On the contrary, we are still inclined to the opinion that this business will not be settled short of a continental war of another French revolution. In view of a revolution there is an active agitation going on among "the peoples" of the Austrian empire, which may spread like the contagion of the cholera or the rinderpest into France. Revolutions, like epidemics, when once started, are apt to travel in every direction where the combustibles upon which they feed are to be found. Poor Austria now, in the midst of her degradation and helplessness, appears to be on the verge of a general break-up through a revolutionary uprising of her various "peoples," especially the heroic and republican people of Hungary, who in 1849 were only checked in their victorious march towards independence by the intervention of Russia with an army of 100,000 men.

That Hungarian revolution was set in motion by the French republican revolution of 1848, resulting in the expulsion of Louis Philippe, and in the setting up of that experimental republic of France, which was first secured and then superseded by the present Napoleon with his coup d'etat and the empire. But why may not the revolutionary contagion spread from Hungary to France, as well as from France to Hungary? When the Emperor's army of 100,000 men, under their hitherto venerated Kaiser with the cry of "Abdicat!" "Abdicat!"—when thousands of brave Hungarians taken as prisoners of war by Prussia, in his service, accept with gratitude the help of Prussia in the undertaking of the independence of Hungary, we may well pause to require—is Austria to go to pieces from this disastrous conflict, or will she still survive, even as a second-rate power.

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that boundary, and the threatening aspect of the relations between Prussia, on the one hand, and Wurtemberg and Bavaria, on the other. In that quarter of Germany all the signs now point ominously to the renewal of the conflict at an early day. A Prussian invasion of Austria east of the Rhine would hardly be unattended by a simultaneous Prussian invasion of Bavaria west of the Rhine, and a Prussian invasion of Bavaria west of the Rhine would hardly be unattended by a simultaneous Prussian invasion of Austria east of the Rhine. In that quarter of Germany all the signs now point ominously to the renewal of the conflict at an early day. A Prussian invasion of Austria east of the Rhine would hardly be unattended by a simultaneous Prussian invasion of Bavaria west of the Rhine, and a Prussian invasion of Bavaria west of the Rhine would hardly be unattended by a simultaneous Prussian invasion of Austria east of the Rhine.

Interpreted by all that the world knows of the third Napoleon's habitual course of conduct at critical emergencies, and illuminated by the light of the existing state of things in Southern Germany, these curious negotiations which have just passed between Paris and Berlin must be taken to be a sort of retrogression of those propositions for a "Congression," which, proceeding from the Tuilleries, preceded the outbreak of the Italian war in 1859, and again of the recent struggle between Austria and Prussia, and has now, the one clear and consistent aim of the policy of the third Napoleon to avoid the methods, while steadily laboring to attain the ends, of the policy of his uncle and predecessor. From the moment when he assumed the scepter, Napoleon III has been visibly impressed with the paramount necessity to his permanent success of persuading Europe that the methods of war and conquest were over, and that the only way to maintain his position as now, when events seem to be fast ripening towards the crowning opportunity of his reign, and France once more seen within her no distant reach the occasion of seizing on some pretext, or some alleged desire, of which has for ages made the Rhine a French river in the profound and passionate conviction of the people of France. Against a player playing so patiently and so warily for a stake so great, the audience and referees of the Royal Bismark may possibly prove successful. But the chances, it must be admitted, look dangerously the other way; and if this last move of Napoleon shall precipitate the impetuous Prussia from its present position, and the course of policy which he has shown himself disposed to adopt towards Southern Germany, the world will not have long to wait for the shock of a French advance in force upon the positions which Count Bismark has now declined to make the subject of diplomacy.

Military Organization in Prussia.

From the Daily News.

The recent exhibitions of prowess with which the Prussian army has astonished the world, have placed it, in public estimation, in the chief rank of national military establishments. It is evidently a most extraordinary army; its armament and commissariat are pronounced not to be equalled by those of any other army in Europe, and the moral individual excellence of the soldiers is stated to be of the highest order. A military critic remarks, and with much truth:—"The Prussian general command 'thinking bayonets,' and find them not the worse tools for the work."

There can be no doubt but that all this excellence is to be attributed to the military organization of Prussia, which is based on the principle that every citizen owes his services to the country. The law of the land demands that every man shall be a soldier, but owing to the limitation of the army to a certain number of men, every person may not be obliged to enter the ranks. When the young Prussian attains the age of twenty the State calls upon him to enter the standing army, in which they remain for five years, the last two of which are spent in the reserve. Formerly it was only necessary to remain in active service for one year, and then to enter the Reserve Guard, after which the soldier was dismissed and placed in the reserve, but was liable to be called out at any time for three years more; but the present King, when Prince Regent, in 1848, by asking the consent of the Reichstag, extended the regular term of active service to three years, which was equivalent to an increase in the peace establishment by nearly one-third. The time of service for professional men, students, etc., however, only one year, and the men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, who are not required for the regular army, are enrolled in the second levy of the Landwehr, of which we shall speak hereafter. Young men of any station in life have to serve in the army, and the State calls upon the number to enter the standing army, in which they remain for five years, the last two of which are spent in the reserve. 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